Data-Dependent Differentially Private Parameter Learning for Directed
  Graphical Models by Chowdhury, Amrita Roy et al.
Data-Dependent Differentially Private Parameter
Learning for Directed Graphical Models
Amrita Roy Chowdhury
Department of Computer Sciences
University of Wisconsin-Madison
amrita@cs.wisc.edu
Theodoros Rekatsinas
Department of Computer Sciences
University of Wisconsin-Madison
thodrek@cs.wisc.edu
Somesh Jha
Department of Computer Sciences
University of Wisconsin-Madison
jha@cs.wisc.edu
Abstract
Directed graphical models (DGMs) are a class of probabilistic models that are
widely used for predictive analysis in sensitive domains, such as medical diagnos-
tics. In this paper we present an algorithm for differentially private learning of the
parameters of a DGM with a publicly known graph structure over fully observed
data. Our solution optimizes for the utility of inference queries over the DGM and
adds noise that is customized to the properties of the private input dataset and the
graph structure of the DGM. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first explicit
data-dependent privacy budget allocation algorithm for DGMs. We compare our
algorithm with a standard data-independent approach over a diverse suite of DGM
benchmarks and demonstrate that our solution requires a privacy budget that is 3×
smaller to obtain the same or higher utility.
1 Introduction
Directed graphical models (DGMs) are widely used in causal reasoning and predictive analytics
where prediction interpretability is desirable [32]. A typical use case of these models is in answering
“what-if” queries over domains that work with sensitive information. For example, DGMs are
used in medical diagnosis for answering questions like what is the most probable disease given a
set of symptoms [43]. In learning such models, it is common that the model’s graph structure is
publicly known. For example, in the case of a medical data set the dependencies between several
physiological symptoms and diseases are well established and standardized. However, the parameters
of the model have to be learned from observations that correspond to the random variables of the
model. These observations may contain sensitive information, as in the case of medical applications;
thus, learning and publicly releasing the parameters of the probabilistic model may lead to privacy
violations [46, 59]. This establishes the need for privacy-preserving learning mechanisms for DGMs.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of privacy-preserving learning of the parameters of a DGM.
For our privacy measure, we use differential privacy (DP) [17] – the de-facto standard for privacy.
We consider the case when the structure of the target DGM is publicly known and the parameters
of the model are learned from fully observed data. In this case, all parameters can be estimated via
counting queries over the input observations (also referred to as data set in the remainder of the
paper). One way to ensure privacy is to add suitable noise to the observations using the standard
Laplace mechanism [17]. Unfortunately, this method is data-independent, i.e., the noise added to the
base observations is agnostic to properties of the input data set and the structure of the DGM, and
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degrades utility. To address this issue, we turn to data-dependent methods, i.e., methods in which the
added noise is customized to the properties of the input data sets [2, 10, 33, 37, 55, 56, 62].
We propose a data-dependent, -DP algorithm for learning the parameters of a DGM over fully
observed data. Our goal is to minimize errors in arbitrary inference queries that are subsequently
answered over the learned DGM. We outline our main contributions as follows:
(1) Explicit data-dependent privacy-budget allocation: Our algorithm computes the parameters
of the conditional probability distribution of each random variable in the DGM via separate mea-
surements from the input data set; this gives rise to an opportunity to optimize the privacy budget
allocation across the different variables with the objective of reducing the error in inference queries.
We formulate this objective in a data-dependent manner; the objective is informed by both the private
input data set and the public graph structure of the DGM. To the best of our knowledge this is the
first paper to propose explicit data-dependent privacy-budget allocation for DGMs. We evaluate our
algorithm on four benchmark DGMs. We demonstrate that our scheme only requires a privacy budget
of  = 1.0 to yield the same utility that a standard data-independent method achieves with  = 3.0.
(2) New theoretical results: To preserve privacy we add noise to the parameters of the DGM. To
understand how this noise propagates to inference queries, we provide two new theoretical results on
the upper and lower bound of the error of inference queries. The upper bound has an exponential
dependency on the treewidth of the input DGM while the lower bound depends on its maximum
degree. We also provide a formulation to compute the sensitivity [35] of the parameters associated
with a node of a DGM targeting only the probability distribution of its child nodes only.
2 Background
We review basic background material for the problems and techniques discussed in this paper.
Directed Graphical Models: A directed graphical model (DGM) or a Bayesian network is a
probabilistic model that is represented as a directed acyclic graph G. The nodes of the graph
represent random variables and the edges encode conditional dependencies between the variables. The
graphical structure of the DGM represents a factorization of the joint probability distribution of these
random variables. Specifically, given a DGM with graph G, let X1, . . . , Xn be the random variables
corresponding to the nodes of G and Xpai denote the set of parents in G for the node corresponding
to variable Xi. The joint probability distribution factorizes as P [X1, . . . , Xn] =
∏n
i=1 P [Xi|Xpai ]
where each factor P [Xi|Xpai ] corresponds to a conditional probability distribution (CPD). For DGMs
with discrete random variables, each CPD can be represented as a table of parameters Θxi|xpai where
each parameter corresponds to a conditional probability and xi and xpai denote variable assignments
Xi = xi and Xpai = xpai .
A key task in DGMs is parameter learning. Given a DGM with known graph structure G, the goal
of parameter learning is to estimate each Θxi|xpai , a task solved via maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE). In the presence of fully observed data D over the random variables of G 1, the maximum
likelihood estimates of the CPD parameters take the closed-form [32]:
Θxi|xpai = C[xi, xpai ]/C[xpai ] (1)
where C[xi] denotes the number of records in D such that Xi = xi.
After learning, the fully specified DGM can be used to answer inference queries, i.e., queries that
seek to compute the marginal or conditional probabilities of certain events (variables) of interest.
Inference queries can also involve evidence, in which case the assignment of a subset of nodes is
fixed. Inference queries are of three types: (1) marginal inference, (2) conditional inference, and (3)
maximum a posteriori (MAP) inference. We refer the reader to Appendix 8.1.1 for more details.
For DGMs, inference queries can be answered exactly by the variable elimination (VE) algo-
rithm [32], which is described in detail in Appendix 8.1.1. The basic idea is that we "eliminate" one
variable at a time following a predefined order ≺ over the graph nodes. Let Φ denote a set of proba-
bility factors φ (initialized with all the CPDs of the DGM) and Z denote the variable to be eliminated.
First, all probability factors involving Z are removed from Φ and multiplied together to generate a
1The attributes of the dataset become the nodes of the DGM’s graph. For the remainder of the paper we use
them interchangeably depending on the context.
2
new product factor. Next Z is summed out from this combined factor generating a new factor φ that
is entered into Φ. VE corresponds to repeated sum-product computations: φ =
∑
Z
∏
φ∈Φ φ.
Differential Privacy: We define differential privacy as follows:
Definition 2.1. An algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy (-DP), where  > 0 is a privacy
parameter, iff for any two datasets D and D′ that differ in a single record, we have
∀t ∈ Range(A), P
[
A(D) = t
]
≤ eP
[
A(D′) = t
]
(2)
A result by [31, 39, 47] shows that the privacy guarantee of a differentially private algorithm can be
amplified by a preceding sampling step. Let A be an -DP algorithm and D is an input data set. Let
A′ be an algorithm that runs A on a random subset of D obtained by sampling it with probability β.
Lemma 2.1. Algorithm A′ will satisfy ′-DP where ′ = ln(1 + β(e − 1))
3 Data-Dependent Differentially Private Parameter Learning for DGMs
We start with an overview of differntially private learning for DGMs over fully observed data and our
data-dependent algorithm for -DP. We then present our algorithm in detail.
3.1 Problem and Approach Overview
LetD be a sensitive data set of size m with attributes X = 〈X1, X2, · · · , Xn〉 and letN be the DGM
of interest. The graph structure G of N defined over the attribute set X is publicly known. Our goal
is to learn the parameters Θ, i.e., the CPDs of N , in a data-dependent differentially private manner
from D. In addition to guaranteeing -DP, we seek to optimize the way noise is introduced in the
learned parameters such that the error in inference queries over the -DP DGM is minimized. Errors
are defined by comparing the inference results over the -DP DGM to the inference results obtained
over the MLE DGM with no noise injection.
We build upon two observations to solve the above problem:
(1) Parameters Θ[Xi|Xpai ] of DGM N can be estimated separately via counting queries over the
empirical marginal table (joint distribution PN [Xi, Xpai ]) of the attribute set Xi ∪Xpai .
(2) The factorization over N decomposes the overall -DP learning problem into a series of separate
-DP learning sub-problems (one for each CPD). As a result the total privacy budget has to be divided
among these sub-problems. However, owing to the structure of the graph and the data set, certain
nodes will have more impact on an inference query than others. Hence, allocating more budget (and
thereby getting better accuracy) to these nodes will result in reduced overall error for the inference
queries. Thus, careful privacy budget allocation across the marginal tables can lead to better utility
guarantees as compared to a naive budgeting scheme that assigns equal budget to all marginal tables.
The above observations are key to our proposed algorithm, which computes the parameters of N
from their respective marginal tables with data-dependent noise injections to guarantee -DP. Our
method is outlined in Algorithm 2 and proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we obtain preliminary
noisy measurements of the parameters of N , which are used along with graph specific properties
(i.e., the height and out-degree of each node) to formulate a data-dependent optimization objective for
privacy budget allocation. The solution of this objective is then used in the second stage to compute
the final parameters. In summary, if B is the total privacy budget available, we spend I of it to
obtain preliminary parameter measurements in Stage I and the remaining B − I is used for the final
parameter computation in Stage II, after optimal allocation across the marginal tables.
Next we describe our algorithm in detail and highlight how we address two core technical challenges
in our approach: (1) how to reduce the privacy budget cost for the first stage I (equivalently increase
B-I ) (see Alg. 2, Lines 1-3), and (2) what properties of the input dataset and graph should the
optimization objective be based on (see Alg. 2, Lines 5-10).
3.2 Algorithm Description
We now describe the two stages of our core method in turn:
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Algorithm 1 Procedure ComputeParameters
Input : D - Data set with attributes X = 〈X1, · · · , Xn〉; E [1, · · · , n] - Array of privacy budget allocation
1: for i = 1 to n
2: Materialize table Ti for the attributes Xi ∪Xpai for D
3: Add noise ∼ Lap( 1E[i] ) to each entry of Ti to generate noisy table T˜i
4: Convert T˜i into noisy marginal table M˜i by converting all negative entries to 0 and then normalization
5: end for
6: MutualConsistency(
⋃
Xi∈X M˜i) \* Ensures mutual consistency among the noisy marginal
tables sharing subsets of attributes*\
7: for i=1 to n
8: Construct Θ˜[Xi|Xpai ] from M˜i
9: end for
10: Return Θ =
⋃
Xi∈X Θ˜[Xi|Xpai ], T˜ =
⋃
Xi∈X T˜i
Algorithm 2 Differentially private learning of the parameters of a directed graphical model
Input : D - Input data set of size m with attributes X = 〈X1, · · · , Xn〉; G - Graph Structure of DGMN ;
B- Total privacy budget; β - Sampling rate for Stage I; I - Privacy budget for Stage I
Output: Θ˜ - Noisy parameters ofN
Stage I : Optimization objective formulation for privacy budget allocation
1:  = ln
(
e
I−1
β
+ 1
)
\* Computing privacy parameter for Stage I *\
2: Construct a new dataset D′ by sampling D with probability β
3: E = [ 
n
, · · · , 
n
]
4: Θˆ, Tˆ = ComputeParameters(D′,E)
5: for i = 1 to n
6: δ˜i =ComputeError (i, Tˆi) \* Estimating error of parameters for node Xi using Eq. (6) *\
7: hi=Height of node Xi
8: oi = Out-degree of node Xi
9: ∆˜Ni = ComputeSensitivity (i, Θˆ) \* Computing sensitivity of the parameters using Eq. (8), (9) *\
10: W [i] = (hi + 1) · (oi + 1) · (∆˜Ni + 1)
11: end for
12: FG,D = ∑n−1i=1 W [i] · δ˜i∗i +W [n] · δ˜nB−I−∑n−1i=1 ∗i \* Optimization Objective *\
Stage II : Final computation of the parameter Θ
13: Solve for E∗ = {∗i } from the optimization objective FG,D using Eq. (10)
14: Θ˜, T˜ = ComputeParameters( D,E∗)
15: Return Θ˜
Stage I – Formulation of optimization objective: First, we handle the trade-off between the two
parts of the total privacy budget I and B-I . While one wants to maximize B − I to reduce the
amount of noise in the final parameters, sufficient budget I is required to obtain good estimates of
the statistics of the data set that are required to form the data-dependent budget allocation objective.
To handle this trade-off, we use Lemma 2.1 to improve the accuracy of the optimization objective
computation (Alg. 2, Lines 1-2). This allows us to assign a relatively low value to I so that our
budget for the final parameter computation is increased. Recall from Lemma 2.1 that if we perform
a preceding sampling step before a -DP mechanism, then the overall mechanism is ′-DP where
′ < . Hence, for large values of m and sampling rate β,
√
β(1−β)
m +
√
2
 <
√
2
′ where LHS is the
error for the above mechanism while RHS is the error of a standard ′-DP mechanism (assuming
Laplace mechanism – Appendix 8.1.2).
Next, we estimate the parameters Θˆ on the aforementioned sampled data set D′ via the procedure
ComputeParameters (described below and outlined in Algorithm 1) using budget allocation E (Alg.
2, Lines 3-4). Note that, Θˆ is only required for the optimization objective formulation and is different
from the final parameters Θ˜ (Alg. 2, Line 13). Hence, for Θˆ we use a naive allocation of policy of
equal privacy budget for all tables by using ComputeParameters (Alg. 2, Line 4).
Finally, lines 5-12 of Algorithm 2 correspond to the estimation of the privacy budget optimization
objective FD,G that depends on the data set D and graph structure G and is detailed in Section 3.3.
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Stage II – Final parameter computation: We solve for the optimal privacy budget allocation E∗
from FD,G and compute the final parameters Θ˜ using ComputeParameters (Alg. 2, Lines 13-15).
Procedure ComputeParameters: This procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1. Its goal is, given a
privacy budget allocation E , to derive the parameters of N in a differentially private manner. To
this end, the algorithm first materializes the table for a subset of attributes Xi ∪Xpai , i ∈ [n] (Alg.
1, Line 2), and then injects noise drawn from Lap( 1E[i] ) into each of its cells (Alg. 1, Line 3) to
generate T˜i [17]. Since each entry of Ti corresponds to a counting query, the sensitivity is 1. Next,
it converts T˜i to a marginal table M˜i, i.e., joint distribution PN [Xi, Xpai ] (Alg. 1, Line 4). This
is followed by ensuring that all M˜is are mutually consistent on all subsets of attributes using the
method described in Appendix 8.2.1. Finally, the algorithm derives Θ˜[Xi|Xpai ] (the noisy estimate
of PN [Xi|Xpai ]) from M˜i (Lines 7-10). Note that deriving the marginal table M˜i from T˜i instead of
directly computing it results in lower error (since the sensitivity of PN [Xi|Xpai ] is 2).
3.3 Optimal Privacy Budget Allocation
Our goal is to find the optimal privacy budget allocation over the marginal tables, M˜i, i ∈ [n] for N
such that the error in the subsequent inference queries on N is minimized.
Observation I: A more accurate estimate of the parameters of N will result in better accuracy for
the subsequent inference queries. Hence, we focus on reducing the total error of the parameters of N .
From Eq (1) and our Laplace noise injection (Alg. 1, Line 3), for a privacy budget of , the value of a
parameter of the DGM computed from the noisy marginal tables M˜i is expected to be
Θ˜[xi|xpai ] =
(
C[xi, xpai ]±
√
2

)/(
C[xpai ]±
√
2

)[
Follows from the Laplace noise added
]
(3)
From the rules of standard error propagation [20], the error in Θ[xi, xpai ] is
δΘ[xi,xpai ] = Θ[xi, xpai ]
√
2
(·C[xpai ])2 +
2
(·C[xi,xpai ])2 =
√
2Θ[xi,xpai ]
 ·
√
1
C[xpai ]
2 +
1
C[xi,xpai ]
2 (4)
where C[xi] denotes the number of records in D with Xi = xi. Thus the mean error
for the parameters of Xi is δi = 1|dom(Xi∪Xpai )|
∑
xi,xpai
δΘ[xi|xpai ] =
√
2
|dom(Xi∪Xpai )| ·∑
xi,xpai
Θ[xi|xpa1 ]
√
1
C[xpai ]
2 +
1
C[xi,xpai ]
2 where dom(S) is the domain of the attribute set S ⊂ X .
Since using the true values of the counts C[x] would lead to privacy violation, our algorithm uses the
noisy estimates from Tˆi (Alg. 2, Line 8).
Observation II: Depending on the data set and the graph structure, different nodes will have different
impact on the final inference queries. This information can be captured by a corresponding weighting
coefficient W [i], i ∈ [n] for each node.
Let i denote the optimal privacy budget for nodeXi. Thus from the above observations, we formulate
our optimization objective FD,G as a weighted sum of the parameter error as follows
minimize
∑n−1
i=1 W [i] · δ˜ii +W [n] · δ˜nB−I−∑n−1i=1 i , i > 0 ∀i ∈ [n] (5)
δ˜i =
1
|dom(Xi∪Xpai )|
∑
xi,xpai
ˆΘ[xi|xpai ]
√
1
Tˆ [xpai ]
2
+ 1
Tˆ [xi,xpai ]
2
, Tˆ [xi, xpai ], Tˆ [xpai ] ∈ Tˆi (6)
W [i] = (hi + 1) · (oi + 1) · (∆˜Ni + 1) (7)
where hi is the height of the node Xi, oi is the out-degree of Xi, ∆Ni is the sensitivity [35] of the
parameters of Xi, δ˜ii gives the measure for estimated mean error for the parameters (CPD) of Xi and
the denominator of the last term captures the linear constraint
∑n
i=1 i = 
B − I .
Computation of weighting coefficient W [i]: For a given node Xi, the weighting coefficient W [i]
is computed from the following three node features:
(1) Height of the node hi: The height of a node Xi is defined as the length of the longest path
between Xi and a leaf node. From the VE algorithm, it is intuitive that when a node with a large
height is eliminated early in the order, its errors can affect the computation of nodes with low height.
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(2) Out-degree of the node oi: A node causally affects all its children nodes. Thus the impact of a
node, with high fan-out degree, on inference queries will be more than say a leaf node.
(3) Sensitivity ∆Ni : Sensitivity of a parameter in a DGM measures the impact of small changes in the
parameter value on a target probability. Laskey [35] proposed a method of computing the sensitivity
by using the partial derivative of output probabilities with respect to the parameter being varied.
However, previous work have mostly focused on the target probability to be a joint distribution of
all the variables. In this paper we present a method to compute sensitivity targeting the probability
distribution of child nodes only. Let ∆Ni denote the mean sensitivity of the parameters of Xi on
target probabilities of all the nodes in Child(Xi)= {set of all the child nodes of Xi}. Formally,
∆Ni =
1
|dom(Xi∪Xpai )|
∑
xi,xpai
1
|Child(Xi)|
∑
Y ∈Child(Xi)
1
|dom(Y )|
∑
y
∂PN [Y=y]
∂Θ[xi|xpai ] (8)
Observe that a node Xi can affect another node Y only iff Y ∈ P (Xi) (its Markov blanket–Defn.
8.1). However due to the factorization of the joint distribution of all random variables of a DGM,
∀Y ∈ P (Xi), Y 6∈ Child(Xi), PN [Y ] can be expressed without Θ[xi|xpai ]. Thus just computing
the mean sensitivity of the parameters over the set of child nodes ∆Ni turns out to be a good weighting
metric for our setting. ∆Ni for leaf nodes is thus 0. Note that ∆
N
i is distinct from the notion of
sensitivity of a function used in Laplace mechanism (Appendix 8.1.2).
Computing Sensitivity ∆Ni : Let Y ∈ Child(Xi) and Γ(Y ) = {Y1, · · · ,Yt}, t < n denote the set
of all nodes {Yi} such that there is a directed path from Yi to Y . Basically Γ(Y ) denotes the set of
ancestors of Y in G. From the factorization ofN it is easy to see that from the conditional probability
distributions of N of the nodes in Γ(Y ) ∪ Y it is sufficient to compute PN [Y ] as follows
PN [Y1, · · · ,Yt, Y ] = PN [Y |Ypa]·
∏
Yi∈Γ(Y )
PN [Yi|Ypai ], PN [Y ] =
∑
Y1
...
∑
Yt
PN [Y1, · · · ,Yt, Y ]
Therefore, using our noisy preliminary parameter estimates (Alg 2, Line 4), we compute
∂P˜N [Y=y]
∂Θ[xi|xpai ]
=
∑
Yi∈Γ(Y )
(∏
Yi∈Γ(Y ) Θˆ[yi|ypai ] · ζxi,xpai (Yi = yi,Ypai = ypai)
)
· Θˆ[Y = y|ypa] · ζxi,xpai (Ypa = ypa)
ζxi,xpai (Z1 = z1, · · · , Zt = zt) =
 1 if
⋃t
i=1 Zi
⋂{Xi ∪Xpai} = ∅
1 if ∀Zi, Zi ∈ {X ∪Xpai} ⇒ zi ∈ {x, xpai}
0 otherwise
(9)
where ζxi|xpai ensures that only the product terms
∏
Yi∈Γ(Y ) Θˆ[yi|ypai ] involving parameters with
attributes in {Xi, Xpai , Y } that match up with the corresponding values in {xi, xpai , y} are retained
in the computation (as all others terms have partial derivative 0). Thus the noisy mean sensitivity
estimate for the parameters of node Xi, ∆˜Ni can be computed from Eq. (8) and (9) (Alg. 2, Line 9).
For example, for the DGM given by Figure 2 for node A (assuming binary attributes for sim-
plicity) we need to compute the sensitivity of its parameters on the target probability of C, i.e.,
∂P [C=0]
∂Θ[A=0] ,
∂P [C=0]
∂Θ[A=1] ,
∂P [C=1]
∂Θ[A=1] and
∂P [C=1]
∂Θ[A=0] which is computed as
∂P˜ [C=0]
∂Θ[A=0] = Θˆ[B = 0]Θˆ[C = 0|A =
0, B = 0] +Θˆ[B = 1]Θˆ[C = 0|A = 0, B = 1]. The rest of the partial derivatives are computed in a
similar manner to give us ∆NA =
1
4
(
∂P [C=0]
∂Θ[A=0] +
∂P [C=0]
∂Θ[A=1] +
∂P [C=1]
∂Θ[A=1] +
∂P [C=1]
∂Θ[A=0]
)
.
Thus the weighting coefficient W [i] is defined as the product of the aforementioned three features
and given by Eq. (7). The extra additive term 1 is used to handle leaf nodes so that the weighting
coefficients are non-zero. Assuming ci = 1W [i]·δ˜i , i ∈ [n], FD,G has a closed form solution as follows
∗i =
(B − I)∏nj=1,j 6=i√cj∑
j∈[n]
∏n
l=1,l 6=j
√
cl
, i ∈ [n− 1], ∗n = B − I −
n−1∑
i=1
∗i (10)
Discussion: Note that there are two paradigms of information to be considered for a DGM - (1)
graph structure G (2) data set D. hi and oi are purely graph characteristics and they summarise the
graphical properties of the node Xi. ∆˜Ni captures the interactions of the graph structure with the
actual parameter values thereby encoding the data set dependent information. Hence we theorize that
the aforementioned three features are sufficient for constructing the weighting coefficients.
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3.4 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 3.1. The proposed algorithm (Algorithm 2) for learning the parameters of a directed
graphical model over fully observed data is B-differentially private.
Proof. The sensitivity of counting queries is 1. Hence, the computation of the noisy tables T˜i (Alg 1,
Line 2-3) is a straightforward application of Laplace mechanism (Section 8.1.2). This together with
Lemma 2.1 makes the computation of T˜i, I -DP. Now the subsequent computation of the optimal
privacy budget allocation E∗ is a post-processing operation on T˜i and hence by Theorem 8.4 is still
I -DP. The final parameter computation is clearly (B-I )-DP. Thus by the theorem of sequential
composition (Theorem 8.3), Algorithm 2 is B-DP. The DGM thus learned can be released publicly
and any inference query run on it will still be -DP (from Theorem 8.4).
4 Error Analysis for Inference Queries
As discussed in Section 3, our optimization objective minimizes a weighted sum of the parameter
errors. To understand how the error propagates from the parameters to the inference queries, we
present two general results bounding the error of a sum-product term of the VE algorithm, given the
errors in the factors.
Theorem 4.1. [Lower Bound] For a DGM N , for any sum-product term of the form φA =∑
x
∏t
i=1 φi, t ∈ {2, · · · , η} in the VE algorithm, we have
δφA ≥
√
η − 1 · δminφi[a,x](φmini [a, x])η−2 (11)
where X is the attribute being eliminated, Attr(φ) is the set of attributes in φ, A =⋃
φi
{Attr(φi)}/X, x ∈ dom(X), a ∈ dom(A), δminφi[a,x] = mini,a,x{δφi[a,x]}, φmini [a, x] =
mini,a,x{φi[a, x]}and η = maxXi{in-degree(Xi)+ out-degree(Xi)}+ 1.
Theorem 4.2. [Upper Bound] For a DGM N , for any sum-product term of the form φA =∑
x
∏t
i=1 φi, t ∈ {2, · · · , n} in the VE algorithm with the optimal elimination order, we have
δφA ≤ 2 · η · dκδmaxφi[a,x]
where X is the attribute being eliminated, κ is the treewidth of G, d is the maximum domain size of
an attribute, Attr(φ) is the set of attributes in φ, η = maxXi{in-degree(Xi) + out-degree(Xi)}+ 1,
A =
⋃t
i{Attr(φi)}/X, a ∈ dom(A), x ∈ dom(X) and δmaxφi[a,x] = maxi,a,x{δφi[a,x]}
For proving the lower bound, we introduce a specific instance of the DGM based on Lemma 8.1. For
the upper bound, with the optimal elimination order of the VE algorithm, the maximum error has
an exponential dependency on the treewidth κ. This is very intuitive as even the complexity of the
VE algorithm has the same dependency on κ. The answer of a marginal inference query is the factor
generated from the last sum-product term. Also, since the initial set of φis for the first sum-product
term computation are the actual parameters of the DGM, all the errors in the subsequent intermediate
factors and hence the inference query itself can be bounded by functions of parameter errors using
the above theorems.
5 Evaluation
We now evaluate the utility of the DGM learned under differential privacy using our algorithm. Specif-
ically, we study the following three questions: (1) Does our scheme lead to low error approximation
of the DGM parameters? (2) Does our scheme result in low error inference query responses? (3) How
does our scheme fare against data-independent approaches?
Evaluation Highlights: First, focusing on the parameters of the DGM, we find that our scheme
achieves low L1 error (at most 0.2 for  = 1) and low KL divergence (at most 0.13 for  = 1) across
all test data sets. Second, we find that for marginal and conditional inferences, our scheme provides
low L1 error and KL divergence (both around 0.05 at max for  = 1) for all test data sets. Our scheme
also provides high accuracy for MAP queries (93.8% accuracy for  = 1 averaged over all test data
sets). Finally, our scheme achieves strictly better utility than the data-independent baseline; our
scheme only requires a privacy budget of  = 1.0 to yield the same utility that the data-independent
baseline achieves with  = 3.0.
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5.1 Experimental Setup
Data sets: We evaluate our proposed scheme on four benchmark DGMs [8] –
(1) Asia: Number of nodes – 8; Number of arcs – 8; Number of parameters – 18
(2) Sachs: Number of nodes – 11; Number of arcs – 17; Number of parameters – 178
(3) Child: Number of nodes – 20; Number of arcs – 25; Number of parameters – 230
(4) Alarm: Number of nodes – 37; Number of arcs – 46; Number of parameters – 509
For all four DGMs, the evaluation is carried out on corresponding synthetic data sets [12, 13] with
10,000 records each.
Metrics: For conditional and marginal inference queries we compute the following two metrics:
L1-error, δL1 =
∑
x,y |P [x|y]− P˜ [x|y]| and KL divergence, DKL =
∑
x,y P˜ [x|y]ln
(
P˜ [x|y]
P [x|y]
)
where
P [x|y] denotes either a true CPD of the DGM (parameter) or a true marginal/conditional inference
query response and P˜ [x|y] is the corresponding noisy estimate obtained from our proposed scheme.
For answering MAP inferences, we compute ρ = # Correct answers#Total runs .
Setup: We evaluate each data set on 20 random inference queries (10 marginal inference, 10
conditional inference) and report mean error over 10 runs. For MAP queries, we run 20 random
queries and report the mean result over 10 runs. The queries are of the form P [X|Y ] where attribute
subsets X and Y are varied from being singletons up to the full attribute set. We compare our
results with a standard data-independent baseline (denoted by D-Ind) [61, 63] which corresponds to
executing Algorithm 1 on the entire input data set D and the privacy budget array E = [ Bn , · · · , 
B
n ].
All the experiments have been implemented in Python and we set eI = 0.1 · eB , β = 0.1.
5.2 Experimental Results
Figure 1 shows the mean δL1 and DKL for noisy parameters and marginal and conditional inferences
for the data sets Sachs and Child. The main observation is that our scheme achieves strictly lower
error than that of D-Ind; specifically our scheme only requires a privacy budget of  = 1.0 to yield
the same utility that D-Ind achieves with  = 3.0. In most practical scenarios, the value of  typically
does not exceed 3 [29]. In Table 1, we present our experimental results for MAP queries. We see
that our scheme achieves higher accuracy. For example, our scheme provides an accuracy of at least
86% while D-Ind achieves 81% accuracy for  = 1. Finally, given a marginal inference query Q, we
compute the scale normalized error in Q as µ = δL1[Q]−LBUB−LB where UB and LB are the upper and
lower bound respectively computed using Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.12. Clearly, the lower the
value of µ is the closer it is to the lower bound and vice versa. We report the mean value of µ for 20
random inference queries (marginal and conditional) for  = 1 in Table 2. We observe that the errors
are closer to their respective lower bounds. This is more prominent for the errors obtained from our
data-dependent scheme than those of D-Ind.
Table 1: MAP Inference Error Analysis

ρ
Asia Sachs Child Alarm
D-Ind Our D-Ind Our D-Ind Our D-Ind Our
Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme
1 0.88 1 0.81 0.86 0.79 0.93 0.89 0.95
1.5 0.93 1 0.87 0.93 0.83 0.95 0.92 0.98
2 1 1 0.92 0.98 0.89 0.97 0.95 1
2.5 1 1 0.96 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2: Error Bound Analysis
µ
Asia Sachs Child Alarm
D-Ind 0.008 0.065 0.0035 0.0046Scheme
Our 0.0035 0.04 0.0014 0.0012Scheme
2UB and LB are computed separately for each run of the experiment from their respective empirical
parameter errors.
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Figure 1: Parameter and Inference (Marginal and Conditional) Error Analysis: We observe that our scheme
only requires a privacy budget of  = 1.0 to yield the same utility that D-Ind achieves with  = 3.0.
Thus we conclude that the non-uniform budget allocation in our data-dependent scheme gives better
utility than an uniform budget allocation. For example, for a total privacy budget B = 1 in DGM
Sachs, our scheme assigns the highest budget ( = 0.1) to node "PKC" which is the root with 5 child
nodes and least budget to "Jnk" ( = 0.004) which is a leaf node .
6 Related Work
In this section we review related literature. There has been a steadily growing amount work in
differentially private machine learning models for the last couple of years. We list some of the most
recent work in this line (not exhaustive list). [1, 3, 53] address the problem of differentially private
SGD. The authors of [41] present an algorithm for differentially private expectation maximization.
In [36] the problem of differentially private M-estimators is addressed. Algorithms for performing
expected risk minimization under differential privacy has been proposed in [9, 49]. In [50] two
differentially private subspace clustering algorithms are proposed.
There has been a fair amount of work in differentially private Bayesian inferencing and related notions
[5, 6, 7, 15, 19, 21, 22, 28, 30, 40, 45, 51, 60, 61, 63]. In [28] the authors present a solution for DP
Bayesian learning in a distributed setting, where each party only holds a subset of the data a single
sample or a few samples of the data. In [19] the authors show that a data-dependent prior learnt
under -DP yields a valid PAC-Bayes bound. The authors in [52] show that probabilistic inference
over differentially private measurements to derive posterior distributions over the data sets and
model parameters can potentially improve accuracy. An algorithm to learn an unknown probability
distribution over a discrete population from random samples under -DP is presented in [14]. In
[7] the authors present a method for private Bayesian inference in exponential families that learns
from sufficient statistics. The authors of [51] and [15] show that posterior sampling gives differential
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privacy "for free" under certain assumptions. In [21] the authors show that Laplace mechanism based
alternative for "One Posterior Sample" is as asymptotically efficient as non-private posterior inference,
under general assumptions. A Rényi differentially private posterior sampling algorithm is presented
in [22]. [60] proposes a differential private Naive Bayes classification algorithm for data streams.
[63] presents algorithms for private Bayesian inference on probabilistic graphical models. In [40],
the authors introduce a general privacy-preserving framework for Variational Bayes. An expressive
framework for writing and verifying differentially private Bayesian machine learning algorithms is
presented in [5]. The problem of learning discrete, undirected graphical models in a differentially
private way is studied in [6]. [45] presents a general method for privacy-preserving Bayesian inference
in Poisson factorization. In [63] the authors propose algorithms for private Bayesian inference on
graphical models. However, their proposed solution does not add data-dependent noise. In fact their
proposed algorithms (Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 as in [63]) are essentially the same in spirit as
our baseline solution D-Ind. Moreover, some proposals from [63] can be combined with D-Ind; for
example to ensure mutual consistency, [63] adds Laplace noise in the Fourier domain while D-Ind
uses techniques of [26]. D-Ind is also identical (D-Ind has an additional consistency step) to an
algorithm used in [61] which uses DGMs to generate high-dimensional data.
A number of data-dependent differentially private algorithms have been proposed in the past few
years. [2, 55, 56, 62] outline data-dependent mechanisms for publishing histograms. In [10] the
authors construct an estimate of the dataset by building differentially private kd-trees. MWEM
[25] derives estimate of the dataset iteratively via multiplicative weight updates. In [37] differential
privacy is achieved by adding data and workload dependent noise. [34] presents a data-dependent
differentially private algorithm selection technique. [18, 24] present two general data-dependent
differentially private mechanisms. Certain data-independent mechanisms attempt to find a better
set of measurements in support of a given workload. One of the most prominent technique is the
matrix mechanism framework [38, 58] which formalizes the measurement selection problem as a
rank-constrained SDP. Another popular approach is to employ a hierarchical strategy [11, 27, 54].
[4, 16, 23, 26, 48, 57] propose techniques for marginal table release.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed an algorithm for differentially private learning of the parameters of a
DGM with a publicly known graph structure over fully observed data. The noise added is customized
to the private input data set as well as the public graph structure of the DGM. To the best of our
knowledge, we propose the first explicit data-dependent privacy budget allocation mechanism for
DGMs. Our solution achieves strictly higher utility than that of a standard data-independent approach;
our solution requires at least 3× smaller privacy budget to achieve the same or higher utility.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Background Cntd.
8.1.1 Directed Graphical Models Cntd.
Figure 2: An example directed graphical model
Definition 8.1 (Markov Blanket). The Markov blanket for a node X in a graphical model, denoted
by P (X), is the set of all nodes whose knowledge is sufficient to predict X and hence shields X from
rest of the network [42]. In a DGM, the Markov blanket of a node consists of its child nodes, parent
nodes and the parents of its child nodes.
For example, in Figure 2, P (D) = {C,E, F}.
Learning Cntd.
As mentioned before in Section 2, for a fully observed DGM, the parameters (CPDs) are computed
via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Let the data set be D = {x1, x2, · · · , xm} with m i.i.d
records with attribute set 〈X1, X2, · · · , Xn〉. The likelihood is then given by
L(Θ,D) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
Θxji |xjpai (12)
where Θxji |xjpai represents the probability that Xi = x
j
i given Xpai = x
j
pai .
Taking logs and rearranging, this reduces to
logL(Θ,D) =
n∑
i=1
∑
xpai
∑
xi
C[xi, xpai ] ·Θ[xi|xpai ] (13)
where C[xi, xpai ] denotes the number of records in data set D such that Xi = xi, Xpai = xpai .
Thus, maximization of the (log) likelihood function decomposes into separate maximizations for the
local conditional distributions which results in the closed form solution
Θxi|xpai =
C[xi, xpai ]
C[xpai ]
(14)
Inference Cntd.
There are three types of inference queries in general:
(1) Marginal inference: This is used to answer queries of the type "what is the probability of a
given variable if all others are marginalized". An example marginal inference query is P [Xn = e] =∑
X1
∑
X2
· · ·∑Xn−1 P [X1, X2, · · · , Xn = e].
(2) Conditional Inference: This type of query answers the probability distribution of some variable
conditioned on some evidence e. An example conditional inference query is P [X1|Xn = e] =
P [X1,Xn=e]
P [Xn=e]
.
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(3) Maximum a posteriori (MAP) inference: This type of query asks for the most likely assignment
of variables. An example of MAP query is
max
X1,··· ,Xn−1
{P [X1, · · · , Xn−1, Xn = e]}
Variable Elimination Algorithm (VE): The complete VE algorithm is given by Algorithm
3. The basic idea of the variable elimination algorithm is that we "eliminate" one variable at a time
following a predefined order ≺ over the nodes of the graph. Let Φ denote a set of probability factors
which is initialized as the set of all CPDs of the DGM and Z denote the variable to be eliminated.
For the elimination step, firstly all the probability factors involving the variable to be eliminated, Z
are removed from Φ and multiplied together to generate a new product factor. Next, the variable Z is
summed out from this combined factor generating a new factor that is entered into Φ. Thus the VE
algorithm essentially involves repeated computation of a sum-product task of the form
φ =
∑
Z
∏
φ∈Φ
φ (15)
The complexity of the VE algorithm is defined by the size of the largest factor. Here we state two
lemmas regarding the intermediate factors φ which will be used in Section 8.3.
Lemma 8.1. Every intermediate factor (φ in (15)) generated as a result of executing the VE algorithm
on a DGM N correspond to a valid conditional probability of some DGM (not necessarily the same
DGM, N ). [32]
Lemma 8.2. The size of the largest intermediary factor generated as a result of running of the VE
algorithm on a DGM is at least equal to the treewidth of the graph [32].
Corollary. The complexity of the VE algorithm with the optimal order of elimination depends on the
treewidth of the graph.
8.1.2 Differential Privacy Cntd.
When applied multiple times, the differential privacy guarantee degrades gracefully as follows.
Theorem 8.3 (Sequential Composition). If A1 and A2 are 1-DP and 2-DP algorithms that use
independent randomness, then releasing the outputs (A1(D),A2(D)) on database D satisfies (1 +
2)-DP.
Another important result for differential privacy is that any post-processing computation performed
on the noisy output of a differentially private algorithm does not cause any loss in privacy.
Theorem 8.4 (Post-Processing). Let A : D 7→ R be a randomized algorithm that is -DP. Let
f : R 7→ R′ be an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f ◦ A : D 7→ R′ is -DP.
Laplace Mechanism: In the Laplace mechanism, in order to publish f(D) where f : D 7→ R,
-differentially private mechanism A publishes f(D) + Lap
(
∆f

)
where ∆f = maxD,D′ ||f(D)−
f(D′)||1 is known as the sensitivity of the query. The pdf of Lap(b) is given by f(x) = 12be(−
|x−µ|
b ).
The sensitivity of the function f basically captures the magnitude by which a single individual’s data
can change the function f in the worst case. Therefore, intuitively, it captures the uncertainty in the
response that we must introduce in order to hide the participation of a single individual. For counting
queries the sensitivity is 1.
8.2 Data-Dependent Differentially Private Parameter Learning for DGMs Cntd.
8.2.1 Consistency between noisy marginal tables
The objective of this step is to input the set of noisy marginal tables M˜i and compute perturbed
versions of these tables that are mutually consistent.
Definition 8.2. Two noisy marginal tables M˜i and M˜j are defined to be consistent (denoted by ≡)
if and only if the marginal table over attributes in Attr(M˜i) ∩Attr(M˜j) reconstructed from M˜i is
exactly the same as the one reconstructed from M˜j , that is,
M˜i[Attr(M˜i) ∩Attr(M˜j)] ≡ M˜j [Attr(M˜i) ∩Attr(M˜j)]. (16)
where Attr(M)is the set of attributes on which marginal table M is defined.
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Algorithm 3 Sum Product Variable Elimination Algorithm
Notations : Φ - Set of factors
X - Set of variables to be eliminated
≺ - Ordering on X
X - Variable to be eliminated
Attr(φ) - Attribute set of factor φ
Procedure Sum-Product-VE(Φ,X,≺)
1: Let X1, · · · , Xk be an ordering of X such that Xi ≺ Xj iff i < j
2: for i = 1, · · · , k
3: Φ← Sum-Product-Eliminate-Var(Φ, Zi)
4: φ∗ ←∏φ∈Φ φ
5: return φ∗
Procedure Sum-Product-Eliminate-Var(Φ, X)
6: Φ′ ← {φ ∈ Φ : Z ∈ Attr(φ)}
7: Φ′′ ← Φ− Φ′
8: ψ ←∏φ∈Φ′ φ
9: φ←∑Z ψ
10: return Φ′′ ∪ {φ}
The following procedure has been reproduced from [26, 44] with a few adjustments.
Mutual Consistency on a Set of Attributes:
Assume a set of tables {M˜i, · · · , M˜j} and let A = Attr(M˜i)∩ · · · ∩Attr(M˜j). Mutual consistency,
i.e., M˜i[A] ≡ · · · ≡ M˜j [A] is achieved as follows:
(1) First compute the best approximation for the marginal table M˜A for the attribute set A as follows
M˜A[A
′] =
1∑j
t=1 t
j∑
t=i
t · M˜t[A′], A′ ∈ A (17)
(2) Update all M˜ts to be consistent with M˜A. Any counting query c is now answered as
M˜t(c) = M˜t(c) +
|dom(A)|
|dom(Attr(M˜)| (M˜A(a)− M˜t(a)) (18)
where a is the query c restricted to attributes in A and M˜t(c) is the response of c on M˜t .
Overall Consistency:
(1) Take all sets of attributes that are the result of the intersection of some subset of
⋃d
i=k+1{Xi ∪
Xpai}; these sets form a partial order under the subset relation.
(2) Obtain a topological sort of these sets, starting from the empty set.
(3) For each set A, one finds all tables that include A, and ensures that these tables are consistent on
A.
8.3 Error Bound Analysis Cntd.
In this section we present our results on the lower and upper bound of the error in inference queries.
Preliminaries and Notations:
For the proofs, we use the following notations. Let X be the attribute that is being eliminated and
let A =
⋃
φi
Attr(φi)\X where Attr(φ) denotes the set of attributes in φ. For some a ∈ dom(A),
from the variable elimination algorithm (Section 8.1.3) for a sum-product term (Eq. (15)) we have
φA [a] =
∑
x
t∏
i=1
φi[x, a] (19)
Let us assume that factor φ[a, x] denotes that V alue(Attr(φ)) ∈ {a} and X = x. Recall that
after computing a sum-product task (given by Eq. (19)), for the variable elimination algorithm
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(Appendix Algorithm 3), we will be left with a factor term over the attribute set A . For example, if
the elimination order for the variable elimination algorithm on our example DGM (Figure 2) is given
by ≺= {A,B,C,D,E, F} and the attributes are binary valued, then the first sum-product task will
be of the following form A = {B,C}, dom(A) = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)} and the RHS φis in
this case happen to be the true parameters of the DGM,
φB,C [0, 0] = Θ[A = 0] ·Θ[C = 0|A = 0, B = 0] + Θ[A = 1] ·Θ[C = 0|A = 1, B = 0]
φB,C [0, 1] = Θ[A = 0] ·Θ[C = 1|A = 0, B = 0] + Θ[A = 1] ·Θ[C = 1|A = 1, B = 0]
φB,C [1, 0] = Θ[A = 0] ·Θ[C = 1|A = 0, B = 0] + Θ[A = 1] ·Θ[C = 1|A = 1, B = 0]
φB,C [1, 1] = Θ[A = 0] ·Θ[C = 1|A = 0, B = 1] + Θ[A = 1] ·Θ[C = 1|A = 1, B = 1]
φB,C = [φB,C [0, 0],φB,C [0, 1],φB,C [1, 0],φB,C [1, 1]]
8.3.1 Lower Bound
Theorem 8.5. For a DGM N , for any sum-product term of the form φA =
∑
x
∏t
i=1 φi, t ∈{2, · · · , n} in the VE algorithm, we have
δφA ≥
√
η − 1δminφi[a,x](φmin[a, x])η−2 (20)
where X is the attribute being eliminated, Attr(φ) denotes the set of attributes in φ, A =⋃
φi
Attr(φi)/X, x ∈ dom(X), a ∈ dom(A), δminφi[a,x] = mini,a,x{δφi[a,x]}, φmin[a, x] =
mini,a,x{φi[a, x]} and η = maxXi{in-degree(Xi) + out-degree(Xi)}+ 1.
Proof. Proof Structure:
The proof is structured as follows. First, we compute the error for a single term φA [a], a ∈ dom(A)
(Eq. (21),(22),(23)). Next we compute the total error δφA by summing over ∀a ∈ dom(A). This is
done by dividing the summands into two types of terms (a) Υφ1[a,x] (b) δ∏ti=1 φi[a,x]∏ti=1 φi[a, x]
(Eq. (25),(26)). We prove that the summation of first type of terms (Υφ1[x]) can be lower bounded by
0 non-trivially. Then we compute a lower bound on the terms of the form δ∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
∏t
i=2 φi[a, x]
(Eq. (31)) which gives our final answer (Eq. (32)).
Step 1: Computing error in a single term φA [a], δφA [a]
The error in φA [a], due to noise injection is given by ,
δφA [a] =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
t∏
i=1
φi[x, a]−
∑
x
t∏
i=1
φ˜i[a, x]
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(
φ1[x, a]
t∏
i=2
φi[x, a]− φ˜1[x, a]
t∏
i=2
φ˜i[x, a]
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(
φ1[x, a]
t∏
i=2
φi[x, a]− φ˜1[x, a]
t∏
i=2
(φi[x, a]± δφi[x,a])
)∣∣∣∣∣ (21)
Using the rule of standard error propagation, we have
δ∏t
i=2 φi[x,a]
=
t∏
i=2
φ˜i[x, a]
√√√√ t∑
i=2
( δφi[x,a]
φi[x, a]
)2
(22)
Thus from the above equation (Eq. (22)) we can rewrite Eq. (21) as follows,
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(
φ1[x, a]
t∏
i=2
φi[x, a]− ˜φ1[x, a]
t∏
i=2
φi[x, a](1± δ∏t
i=2 φi[x,a]
)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(
(φ1[a, x]− ˜φ1[a, x])
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x]± δ∏t
i=1 φi[a,x]
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]
)∣∣∣∣∣ (23)
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Step 2: Compute total error δφA
Now, total error in φA is
δφA =
∑
a
δφA [a] (24)
Collecting all the product terms from the above equation (24) with φ1[a, x]−φ˜1[a, x] as a multiplicand,
we get
Υφ1[a,x] = (φ1[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x])
∑
a
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x] (25)
Thus δφA can be rewritten as
δφA =
∑
a,x
Υφ1[a,x] ±
∑
a,x
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]δ∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
(26)
First we show that for a specific DGM we have
∑
a,x Υφ1[a,x] = 0 as follows. Let us assume that the
DGM has Attr(φ1) = X . Thus φ1[a, x] reduces to just φ1[x].
Υφ1[x] = (φ1[x]− φ˜1[x])
∑
a
t∏
i=2
φi[x]
= (φ1[x]− φ˜1[x])
(∑
ak
· · ·
∑
a1
t∏
i=2
φi[a1, · · · , ak, x]
)
[A = 〈A1, · · ·Ak〉, aj ∈ dom(Aj), j ∈ [k]]
= (φ1[x]− φ˜1[x])
(∑
ak
· · ·
∑
a2
t∏
i=3
φi[a2, · · · , ak, x]
∑
a1
φ2[a1, · · · , ak, x]
)
[Assuming that φ2 is the only factor with attribute A1]
Now each factor φi is either a true parameter (CPD) of the DGM N or a CPD over some other DGM
(lemma 8.1). Thus, let us assume that φ2 represents a conditional of the form P [A1|A, X],A = A/A1.
Thus we have
∑
a1
φ2[a1, · · · , ak, x] =
∑
a1
P [A1 = a1|A2 = a2, · · · ,Ak = ak, X = x] = 1. Now
repeating the above process over all i ∈ {3, · · · , t}φis , we get
Υφ1[x] = φ1[x]− φ˜1[x] (27)
For the ease of understanding, we illustrate the above result on our example DGM (Figure 2). Let us
assume that the order of elimination is given by ≺= 〈A,B,C,D,E, F 〉. For simplicity, again we
assume binary attributes. Let φC be the factor that is obtained after eliminating A and B. Thus the
sum-product task for eliminating C is given by
φD,E [0, 0] = φC [C = 0] ·Θ[D = 0|C = 0]Θ[E = 0|C = 0]
+φC [C = 1] ·Θ[D = 0|C = 1]Θ[E = 0|C = 1]
φD,E [0, 1] = φC [C = 0] ·Θ[D = 0|C = 0]Θ[E = 1|C = 0]
+φC [C = 1] ·Θ[D = 0|C = 1]Θ[E = 1|C = 1]
φD,E [1, 0] = φC [C = 0] ·Θ[D = 1|C = 0]Θ[E = 0|C = 0]
+φC [C = 1] ·Θ[D = 1|C = 1]Θ[E = 0|C = 1]
φD,E [1, 1] = φC [C = 0] ·Θ[D = 1|C = 0]Θ[E = 1|C = 0]
+φC [C = 1] ·Θ[D = 1|C = 1]Θ[E = 1|C = 1]
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Hence considering noisy φ˜D,E we have,
ΥφC [0] = (φC [C = 0]− φ˜C [C = 0]) · (Θ[D = 0|C = 0]Θ[E = 0|C = 0]
+Θ[D = 0|C = 0]Θ[E = 1|C = 0] + Θ[D = 1|C = 0]Θ[E = 0|C = 0]
+Θ[D = 1|C = 0]Θ[E = 1|C = 0])
= (φC [C = 0]− φ˜C [C = 0]) ·
(
Θ[D = 0|C = 0](Θ[E = 0|C = 0] + Θ[E = 1|C = 0])
+
(
Θ[D = 1|C = 0](Θ[E = 0|C = 0] + Θ[E = 1|C = 0]))
= (φC [C = 0]− φ˜C [C = 0]) ·
(
Θ[D = 0|C = 0] + Θ[D = 1|C = 0])[
∵ Θ[E = 0|C = 0] + Θ[E = 1|C = 0] = 1
]
= φC [C = 0]− φ˜C [C = 0] (28)[
∵ Θ[D = 0|C = 0] + Θ[D = 1|C = 0] = 1
]
Similarly
ΥφC [1] = φC [C = 1]− φ˜C [C = 1] (29)
Now using Eq. (27) and summing over ∀x ∈ dom(X)∑
x
Υφ1[x] =
∑
x
(φ1[x]− φ˜1[x])
= 0
[
∵
∑
x
φ1[x] =
∑
x
φ˜1[x] = 1
]
(30)
Referring back to our example above, since φC [1]+φC [0] = φ˜C [C = 0]+ φ˜C [C = 1], quite trivially
φC [C = 0] + φC [C = 1] = φ˜C [C = 0] + φ˜C [C = 1]
⇒ (φC [C = 0]− φ˜C [C = 0]) + (φC [C = 1]− φ˜C [C = 1]) = 0
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Thus, from Eq. (26)
δφA =
∑
x
Υφ1[x] ±
∑
a,x
δ∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]
=
∑
a,x
δ∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]
[
From Eq. (30) and dropping ± as we are dealing with errors
]
≥ δmin∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
∑
a,x
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x][
δmin∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
= min
a,x
{
δ∏t
i=2 φi[a,x]
}]
≥ δmin∏t
i=2 φi[a,x][
∵ By Lemma 8.1 φA is a CPD, thus
∑
a,x
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x] ≥ 1
]
= mina,x
{
t∏
i=2
φi[x, a]
√√√√ t∑
i=2
( δφi[a,x]
φi[a, x]
)2}
≥ mina,x
{
t∏
i=2
φi[x, a]
√
(t− 1)
( δminφi[a,x]
φi[x, a]
)2}
[δminφi[x,a] = mini,a,x
{
δφi[a,x]
}
]
≥ mina,x
{√
(t− 1)
δminφi[a,x]
φmaxi
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x]
}[
φmaxi = max
i
{φi[a, x]}
]
≥ δminφi[a,x]
√
t− 1(φmini [a, x])t−2
[
Assuming φmini [a, x] = mini,a,x{φi[a, x]}
]
(31)
Now, recall from the variable elimination algorithm that during each elimination step, if Z is the
variable being eliminated then we the product term contains all the factors that include Z. For a
DGM with graph G, the maximum number of such factors is clearly η = maxXi{out-degree(Xi) +
in-degree(Xi)} + 1 of G, i.e., t ≤ η. Additionally we have φmin[a, x] ≤ 1dmin ≤ 12 where dmin
is the minimum size of dom(Attr(φ)) and clearly dmin ≥ 2. Since 2t ≥
√
t, t ≥ 2, under the
constraint that t is an integer and φmin[a, x] ≤ 12 , we have
δφA ≥
√
η − 1δminφi[a,x](φmin[a, x])η−2 (32)
8.3.2 Upper Bound
Theorem 8.6. For a DGM N , for any sum-product term of the form φA =
∑
x
∏t
i=1 φi, t ∈{2, · · · , n} in the VE algorithm with the optimal elimination order, we have
δφA ≤ 2 · η · dκδmaxφi[a,x]
where X is the attribute being eliminated, κ is the treewidth of G, d is the maximum domain size of
an attribute, Attr(φ) denotes the set of attributes in φ, A =
⋃t
i{Attr(φi)}/X, a ∈ dom(A), x ∈
dom(X), δmaxφi[a,x] = maxi,a,x{δφi[a,x]} and η = maxXi{in-degree(Xi) + out-degree(Xi)}+ 1.
Proof. Proof Structure:
The proof is structured as follows. First we compute an upper bound for a product of t > 0 noisy
factors φ˜i[a, x], i ∈ [t] (Lemma 8.7). Next we use this lemma, to bound the error, δφA [a], for the
factor, φA [a], a ∈ dom(A) (Eq. (33)). Finally we use this result to bound the total error, δφA , by
summing over ∀a ∈ dom(A) (Eq. (34)).
Step 1: Computing the upper bound of the error of a single term φ˜A [a], δφA [a]
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Lemma 8.7. For a ∈ dom(A), x ∈ dom(X)
t∏
i=1
φ˜i[a, x] ≤
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x] +
∑
i
δφi[a,x]
Proof. First we consider the base case when t = 2.
Base Case:
φ˜1[a, x]φ˜2[a, x] = (φ1[a, x]± δφ1[a,x])(φ2[a, x]± δφ2[a,x])
≤ (φ1[a, x] + δφ1[a,x])(φ2[a, x] + δφ2[a,x])
= (φ1[a, x] · φ2[a, x] + δφ1[a,x](φ2[a, x] + δφ2[a,x]) + δφ2[a,x] · φ1[a, x])
≤ (φ1[a, x] · φ2[a, x] + δφ1[a,x] + δφ2[a,x]φ1[a, x])[
∵ (φ2[a, x] + δφ2[a,x]) ≤ 1 as φ˜i[a, x] is still a valid probability distribution
]
≤ φ1[a, x] · φ2[a, x] + δφ1[a,x] + δφ2[a,x][
∵ φ1[a, x] < 1
]
Inductive Case:
Let us assume that the lemma holds for t = k. Thus we have
k+1∏
i=1
φ˜i[a, x] =
k∏
i=1
φ˜i[a, x] · φ˜k+1[a, x]
≤ (
k∏
i=1
φi[a, x] +
∑
i
δφi[a,x]) · (φk+1[a, x] + δφk+1 [a, x])
≤
k+1∏
i=1
φi[a, x] +
∑
i
δφi[a,x] · (φk+1[a, x] + δφk+1 [a, x]) + δφk+1 [a, x]
k∏
i=1
φi[a, x]
≤
k+1∏
i=1
φi[a, x] +
k+1∑
i=1
δφi[a,x] + δφk+1 [a, x]
k∏
i=1
φi[a, x]
[∵ (φk+1[a, x] + δφk+1[a,x]) ≤ 1 as φ˜k+1[a, x] is still a valid probability distribution]
≤
k+1∏
i=1
φi[a, x] +
k+1∑
i=1
δφi[a,x][∵ ∀i, φi[a, x] ≤ 1]
Hence, we have
t∏
i=1
φ˜i[a, x] ≤
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x] +
∑
i
δφi[a,x]
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Next, we compute the error for the factor, φA [a], a ∈ dom(A) as follows
δφA[a] =
∣∣∣∑
x
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]−
∑
x
t∏
i=1
φ˜i[a, x]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∑
x
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]− φ1[a, x]
t∏
i=2
˜φi[a, x]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∑
x
t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x]
t∏
i=2
(φi[a, x]± δφi[a,x])
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∑
x
( t∏
i=1
φi[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x](
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x] +
t∑
i=2
δφi[a,x])
)∣∣∣[Using Lemma 8.7]
≤
∣∣∣∑
x
(
(φ1[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x])
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x] + φ˜1[a, x]
t∑
i=2
δφi[a,x]
)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∑
x
(
(φ1[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x])
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x] + ηφ˜1[a, x]δ
∗
φi[a,x]
)∣∣∣[
∵ t ≤ η and assuming δ∗φi[a,x] = maxi,x {δφi[a,x]}
]
=
∣∣∣∑
x
(φ1[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x])
t∏
i=2
φi[a, x] + ηδ
∗
φi[a,x]
∑
x
φ˜1[a, x]
∣∣∣
≤
∑
x
∣∣∣φ1[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x]∣∣∣+ ηδ∗φi[a,x]∑
x
φ˜1[a, x] (33)[
∵ φi[a, x] ≤ 1
]
Step 2: Computing the upper bound of the total error δφA
Now summing over ∀a ∈ dom(A),
δφA =
∑
a
δφA [a]
≤
∑
a
(∑
x
|φ1[a, x]− φ˜1[a, x]|+ ηδ∗φi[a,x]
∑
x
φ˜1[a, x]
)
[From eq (33)]
= δφ1 + ηδ
max
φi[a,x]
∑
a
∑
x
φ˜1[a, x]
[
δmaxφi[a,x] = maxa
{δ∗φi[a,x]}
]
Now by Lemma 8.2, maximum size of A ∪X is given by the treewidth of the DGM, κ. Thus from
the fact that φ1 is a CPD (Lemma 8.1), we observe that
∑
a
∑
x φ˜1[a, x] is maximized when φ1[a, x]
is of the form P [A′|A], A′ ∈ A ∪X, |A′| = 1,A = (A ∪X)/A′ and is upper bounded by dκ where
d is the maximum domain size of an attribute.
δφA ≤ δφ1 + ηdκδmaxφi[a,x][By lemma 8.2 and that φ1 is CPD from lemma 8.1]
where κ is the treewidth of G and d is the maximum domain size of an attribute
≤ 2 · η · dκδmaxφi[a,x]
[
∵ δφ1 ≤ η · dκδmaxφi[a,x]
]
(34)
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